To understand Boeing’s situation you have to understand McDonnell Douglas. And we go back to the DC-10 cargo door issue.
That’s a long read, so here’s the short version. The DC-10 cargo door was held on from the outside by rotating latches; when fully engaged the pressure inside the aircraft would push the latches closed so the door was VERY secure, but if the latches weren’t fully engaged the pressure would push the latches open. The telltale showing the cargo operator that the latch was fully engaged wasn’t connected to the latch, but rather the handle, which was itself connected to the latch via a spring. If the operator pushed the latch closed too hard or too fast, the spring would bend, and the telltale would show the door as latched, even though it wasn’t.
If the door flies open in flight that means explosive decompression of the cargo area. That means the pressure of the air in the passenger cabin pushing down on the floor is huge, measured in tons per square meter. It’s worth noting that the control cables that carry movement from the yoke to the rudder/elevator control surfaces in the tail go through the floor.
One of these failed on a mostly empty flight. The floor buckled and a few seats were sucked down through the floor and out of the airplane. The pilots lost all rudder control but miraculously were able to land the jet without further injury. FAA investigated and found the problem, Douglas made a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with FAA that they would fix this quietly without an embarrassing Airworthiness Directive (forcing all operators to comply and damaging Douglas’s reputation). At all points, the priority for Douglas management was avoiding bad reputation and excess expense, not making sure the aircraft were safe.
A European operator then wasn’t subscribed to Douglas’s maintenance service so the update never happened. And another one failed- this one on a VERY full flight with ~350 people on it. The added weight on the floor caused a much larger section of the floor to fail, the control lines were all severed, and the plane crashed with no survivors.
In the 1990s, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing merged. The Boeing management team (mostly engineers) was replaced with the Douglas management team (bean counters). Their headquarters then moved from Seattle (where they build planes) to Washington, DC (where they lobby for federal contracts).
Granted it’s 30 years after that merge, but it’s pretty obvious the same management strategy is still in charge.
Take the 787 Dreamliner. Their strategy there was reduce all the expensive engineers, instead just write the specs and outsource design and build of entire subsystems. It had lots of teething problems, I’ve heard reports that some parts with tolerances measured in tenths of a millimeter were off by half an inch or more (and that was the reject pile, ones off by less were ground down and hammered into place). Other than some battery problems the aircraft has been pretty safe though.
And now take the MAX product line. A few years back you had issues with MCAS- a computer that makes the new jet fly like the old jet so pilots won’t need retraining, even though the new jet ISN’T like the old jet and flies quite differently and if MCAS fails you’ll have a very different beast on your hands (none of this was mentioned in the operation manual). That caused some crashes.
Now you have this door plug issue. It’s worth noting that Boeing has outsourced assembly of the entire fuselage to another company, who (from what I’ve read) is constantly pressured to increase production and decrease costs. NOT a safety culture.
From some reports I’ve read, procedure at the other company was to make the bolts on the door plug ‘finger tight’ for transport, because not all customers would want the door plug, some would want the actual emergency exit door. So that means with a little bit of vibration on those bolts, the door plug is only held in place by gravity and prayers.
FAA is now supposedly doing some kind of major audit of Boeing manufacturing, and is considering no longer allowing Boeing to self-certify their quality control processes. I’m quite sure it’ll turn up a lot of dirt.
What I HOPE happens is that the market, both the stock market and the aircraft market, heavily punish Boeing and/or demand that their management be replaced. I’m not holding my breath though.
To understand Boeing’s situation you have to understand McDonnell Douglas. And we go back to the DC-10 cargo door issue.
That’s a long read, so here’s the short version. The DC-10 cargo door was held on from the outside by rotating latches; when fully engaged the pressure inside the aircraft would push the latches closed so the door was VERY secure, but if the latches weren’t fully engaged the pressure would push the latches open. The telltale showing the cargo operator that the latch was fully engaged wasn’t connected to the latch, but rather the handle, which was itself connected to the latch via a spring. If the operator pushed the latch closed too hard or too fast, the spring would bend, and the telltale would show the door as latched, even though it wasn’t.
If the door flies open in flight that means explosive decompression of the cargo area. That means the pressure of the air in the passenger cabin pushing down on the floor is huge, measured in tons per square meter. It’s worth noting that the control cables that carry movement from the yoke to the rudder/elevator control surfaces in the tail go through the floor.
One of these failed on a mostly empty flight. The floor buckled and a few seats were sucked down through the floor and out of the airplane. The pilots lost all rudder control but miraculously were able to land the jet without further injury. FAA investigated and found the problem, Douglas made a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with FAA that they would fix this quietly without an embarrassing Airworthiness Directive (forcing all operators to comply and damaging Douglas’s reputation). At all points, the priority for Douglas management was avoiding bad reputation and excess expense, not making sure the aircraft were safe.
A European operator then wasn’t subscribed to Douglas’s maintenance service so the update never happened. And another one failed- this one on a VERY full flight with ~350 people on it. The added weight on the floor caused a much larger section of the floor to fail, the control lines were all severed, and the plane crashed with no survivors.
In the 1990s, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing merged. The Boeing management team (mostly engineers) was replaced with the Douglas management team (bean counters). Their headquarters then moved from Seattle (where they build planes) to Washington, DC (where they lobby for federal contracts).
Granted it’s 30 years after that merge, but it’s pretty obvious the same management strategy is still in charge.
Take the 787 Dreamliner. Their strategy there was reduce all the expensive engineers, instead just write the specs and outsource design and build of entire subsystems. It had lots of teething problems, I’ve heard reports that some parts with tolerances measured in tenths of a millimeter were off by half an inch or more (and that was the reject pile, ones off by less were ground down and hammered into place). Other than some battery problems the aircraft has been pretty safe though.
And now take the MAX product line. A few years back you had issues with MCAS- a computer that makes the new jet fly like the old jet so pilots won’t need retraining, even though the new jet ISN’T like the old jet and flies quite differently and if MCAS fails you’ll have a very different beast on your hands (none of this was mentioned in the operation manual). That caused some crashes.
Now you have this door plug issue. It’s worth noting that Boeing has outsourced assembly of the entire fuselage to another company, who (from what I’ve read) is constantly pressured to increase production and decrease costs. NOT a safety culture.
From some reports I’ve read, procedure at the other company was to make the bolts on the door plug ‘finger tight’ for transport, because not all customers would want the door plug, some would want the actual emergency exit door. So that means with a little bit of vibration on those bolts, the door plug is only held in place by gravity and prayers.
FAA is now supposedly doing some kind of major audit of Boeing manufacturing, and is considering no longer allowing Boeing to self-certify their quality control processes. I’m quite sure it’ll turn up a lot of dirt.
What I HOPE happens is that the market, both the stock market and the aircraft market, heavily punish Boeing and/or demand that their management be replaced. I’m not holding my breath though.