A revived legal dispute over a Christian music teacher’s refusal to use students’ preferred names and pronouns will offer an early test of the US Supreme Court’s new standard for religious accommodations in the workplace.
A revived legal dispute over a Christian music teacher’s refusal to use students’ preferred names and pronouns will offer an early test of the US Supreme Court’s new standard for religious accommodations in the workplace.
I don’t think you even need a transphobia argument; there’s a pretty clear case for basic discrimination by sex, which is much legally tighter. We all know that this teacher would have zero issues calling a James by Jimmy, or an Elizabeth by Liz. The teacher is refusing to allow a child to use a name of a given gender association purely because of the child’s sex.
And conveniently, this is the exact argument that Gorsuch used in banning workplace discrimination against queer people: it’s discrimination on the basis of sex to mistreat someone for dating or marrying a man solely because he is also a man.
I think I do need the transphobia argument, because transphobia is bad and it is good to argue against it. The fact “it could be fought with simple contract law if it had to be” not withstanding.
I’d amend your stance as well to “perceived sex”.
Oh for sure, and I’m not meaning to downplay the impact there. I’m speaking very strictly on the tightness of the legal argument.
“I have shown that this person is transphobic” may not necessarily convince a judge, whereas “I have shown that this person is discriminating on the basis of sex in blatant violation of Title IX” is a legal slam dunk.